Susan Okin: Gender and Cultural Differences
abstract:
As one of the representative political and social theorists of liberalism, the late famous scholar Susan Okin has long been concerned about the tension between the respect for group cultural customs and the protection of women’s rights and interests advocated by multiculturalism. In this paper, Okin tries to solve such a problem by refuting the criticism of anti-essentialist feminism: how to establish a justice theory that is universal and principled and can take into account the differences between individuals and social groups? Through comparative analysis based on empirical research, Okin reiterated the legitimacy of gender as an independent analytical category, and it is applicable to the situation of women in different cultural and economic backgrounds. Finally, she advocates an improved Rawls’ theory of justice, introducing gender and family into this framework, and establishing a theoretical framework of feminist justice through "veil of ignorance", which can simultaneously consider the universality and differences in women’s experience.
About the author:
Susan Moller Okin, Department of Sociology, Stanford University
Compilation source:
Okin, S. M. (1994). Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences.Political Theory, 22(1), 5-24.
Susan Okin, author of this article
Theories of justice are suffering from some kind of identity crisis. After all, how can the theory of justice be universal, principled and based on sufficient reasons acceptable to all, while taking into account the differences between individuals and social groups? Feminism is one of the first schools to point out that a large number of people are excluded from the so-called universalism theory. Some feminists even point out that many feminist theories ignore racism, heterosexualism, class, religion and other prejudices while considering gender discrimination or prejudice. However, when other prejudices are taken into consideration by feminism, some feminists also find that it seems that there is a problem to establish a theory of justice on the basis of completely listening to the views and needs of each specific individual or group-is it possible to draw any principles of justice in this way? Considering the possibility of "false consciousness" (Note 1), is it even possible that this is a reliable method? Will emphasizing differences, especially cultural differences, not fall to relativism?
This is an important issue. It is now acknowledged that most theories of justice did not take many different groups into account when they were constructed. However, how can we construct a coherent and feasible theory of justice and make all different groups express themselves and get the attention they deserve? This article will return to this question at the end.
Feminism, Differentialism and Essentialism
Feminists have had much discussion about differences. One aspect of the discussion is a continuation of an old argument-about how women are different from men, what may cause this difference, and whether these differences require other aspects of law and public policy to treat women and men differently. Another (newer) aspect of the discussion about differences is about the differences between women. Some people think that talking about women and talking about women’s problems, especially the problem of women’s "self", is an "essentialist". According to this view, the upper-middle-class feminists of white people not only exclude or don’t care about the women’s problems of other races, cultures and religions, but also don’t care about the women’s problems of other classes besides themselves. Therefore, people who oppose this essentialism believe that "gender" is a problematic category unless it is used under the restrictions of race, class, nationality, religion and other differences.
The accusation of feminist essentialism is valid for some works. For example, well-off feminists like Harriet Taylor, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Virginia Woolf, Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan all seem to assume that their liberated women will live on servants. Except for Woolf who briefly discussed the difficulties of maids, most of them did not pay attention to the problems of servants-of course, most of them were women. In the mid-19th century, many middle-and upper-class white feminists only considered their own tendencies of women of the same class and race (some even became explicit racists), which made Sojourner Truth make a sharp and famous shout in her speech: "Am I not a woman? （Ain’t I a women? ) "But I think, and will be discussed below, this essentialism problem is far from appearing in most recent feminist works. But now there seems to be more and more criticism of "essentialism". Elizabeth Spelman wrote in "Non-essential Women"(In Essential Women) (1988) is a summary of such views: "The concern about women as women is only aimed at a group of women-white middle-class women in western industrialized countries" (Note 2). In some circles, this has been considered as a self-evident truth.
There are three main sources that hold that many feminist theories are essentialism recently: postmodernism under the influence of Europe; The works of African-American and other ethnic feminist women in the United States and Britain; And spelman’s book "Non-essential Women". Postmodernism is skeptical of all universal or general propositions, including feminist propositions. It holds that the core concepts of feminist thought, such as "gender" and "woman", are as unreasonable as other categories that do not consider individual differences.
Spelman, on the other hand, holds that "as a woman is a Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentrism"; The great mistake of middle-class white feminists is to exclude women who are different from themselves from their social criticism, or even if they are included, they assume that no matter what their differences are, they have the same experience of gender discrimination. She believes that the existing theory is at most "an additive analysis, that is, in a society where racism and sexism coexist, the oppression of black women seems to be a further burden, but in fact it is a different burden."
However, these anti-essentialist arguments often stay in theory and lack empirical evidence. Most of spelman’s examples about the differences of women’s experiences of oppression come from slavery in ancient Greece and the south before the American Civil War. But at present, it is not clear how much the obvious contrast between the experiences of white slave owners’ wives and black female slaves is related to most of the same or different problems involving forms of gender oppression today.
In addition to the lack of relevant evidence, spelman’s anti-essentialism proposition has two problems. One problem is that this view holds that feminist theorists either recognize that gender identity is intrinsically related to class, race or other aspects of identity, or completely ignore the influence of these differences. But this is completely untrue. People can refute that gender discrimination is an identifiable form of oppression, and women can feel its influence regardless of race or class, but there is no need to deny the seriousness of racial and class oppression.
Another problem is that spelman misplaced the burden of proof, which probably made her think that there was no need to provide a basis for her claim. But in fact, the burden of proof lies with the critics. In order to convince people, she needs to prove how the theory accused of essentialism omits or distorts the experience of others except a few. One problem with anti-essentialist feminism is that it tends to replace arguments and evidence with "we are all different". As will be demonstrated below, when some western feminist views on justice are applied to the situation of poor women in many poor countries, it can be concluded that the situation of these women is "similar to ours (white women) but worse" ("similar to ours but more so").
Therefore, this paper responds to spelman’s challenge and makes a reasonable and rigorous test of anti-essentialism feminist theory. Spelman said to the new research on women in many fields, "These researchers should not assume that women have something in common as women, but should help us to see if they have something in common; We should not infer that what is right for some women is right for all women; We must investigate the lives of different women and see what they have in common. "
As a scholar trained in philosophy, spelman seems to think that there is no need to actually examine some empirical evidence. After publishing the above arguments, she went back to discuss Plato. However, as a political scientist, the author of this paper tries to study some comparative evidence in this paper, and applies the theory developed under the background of women in rich western industrial countries to examine the situation of some of the poorest women in poor countries to test some views on justice and inequality in western feminism. In the face of huge cultural and socio-economic differences, how does the description and explanation of gender inequality in western feminist theory stand the test?
Similarities and differences of gender oppression: poor women in poor countries
In order to answer the questions raised in the last section, this part will discuss four specific issues in turn, which have recently aroused the discussion of many feminist scholars and development theorists who criticize British and American political theories. First of all, why has the problem of gender inequality been ignored or covered up for so long, and it has not been taken seriously until recent decades? Second, why is it so important to solve this problem? Thirdly, when we apply the standard of justice to the family, and when we examine the gender inequality that is concealed in the family, what do we find? Finally, what will these findings mean to policy making?
Why is the focus on gender relatively new?
In development studies and justice theory, until recently, there was an obvious lack of attention to gender, especially the systematic inequality between the sexes. This point was put forward in the theory of justice in the 1980s. In the literature of development research, this issue was first put forward by Ester Boserup, but it has only received more attention and development from scholars in recent years. In these two research fields, women and gender issues are ignored for two main reasons.
The first reason is that researchers have long assumed the family as the basic unit of analysis and research, while men are usually assumed to be the head of the family. The dichotomy between public domain (political and economic domain) and private domain (family and personal domain) is acquiesced, and only the former (namely public domain) is considered as the scope of development research and justice theory. In ethics and political theory, the family is usually considered as an unsuitable field to discuss justice, because love, altruism or common interests are considered to occupy a dominant position in the family. On the other hand, people sometimes think that the family is a hierarchical and unfair field. (Some theorists, including Rousseau, even agree with both views at the same time! ) The dichotomy of public and private and the assumption that men are the parents have caused many serious influences on women, because these assumptions not only blur the inequality in the distribution of resources and power within the family, but also lead to the fact that a lot of work done by women is not regarded as work, because all recognized "work" is considered to be done in the "public" field for remuneration. Many jobs that women do, such as giving birth and raising children, cleaning and maintaining the family, caring for the elderly and the sick, and contributing to men’s work in various ways, are not considered as jobs. Obviously, at this point, the situation of poor women in poor countries is not fundamentally different from that of most women in rich countries.
The second reason is that researchers fail to separate data or arguments by gender, which is closely related to the first reason. Recently, there has been a practice called "false gender neutrality", such as using neutral terms ("he or she", "persons", etc.), but it is invalid or wrong if it is actually applied to women.
The above two reasons have the same impact, that is, women have not been included in the researchers’ consideration, and the problem of gender inequality has been covered up.
Why is gender important?
As discussed in the book Justice, Gender and Family, the author thinks that the neglect of gender and women’s life by justice theory and development theory is an important problem for three reasons. First (and obviously), women are very important (at least for feminists), and their well-being is at least as important as men.
Second, the failure of social justice theory to face up to the problem of gender inequality has seriously affected the equality of opportunities-including women and girls, and more and more boys. Part of the reason is that families headed by women have greater financial difficulties. According to recent estimates, one-third of households in the world are headed by single women, and the proportion is much higher in areas where men migrate in large numbers. Millions of children are affected by the high poverty rate in these families. In addition, the gender division of labor has a more direct impact on the opportunities of girls and women, which exists at all levels. Women’s opportunities are greatly influenced by the structure of family life, especially the fact that women almost always take care of people, which has a great influence on whether they can engage in full-time paid jobs. This also leads them to overwork frequently, which makes them not considered as having economic value like men. This is also "similar but more serious" among poor families in many poor countries. Girls may work for their families at an early age, and they are much less likely to be educated and literate than boys in the same family, and they are less valued and less likely to survive than their brothers, because they are more likely to be deprived of food or medical care.
Thirdly, it is important to solve the problem of fair distribution within the family, because the family is the first school for moral development and can be said to be the most influential school. It is the first environment for us to experience how people treat each other. In this environment, we may learn how to be fair or unfair. If children see that gender differences are the cause of obvious discrimination, they will certainly be affected in their personal and moral development. This view was first put forward by John Stuart Mill (1988) in the western context. He thought that in his time, the typical British family had a "distorted influence", and therefore he called it "a school of despotism". Compared with families in developed countries, many third world families seem to be worse moral schools, because they have successfully instilled that gender inequality is natural and appropriate.
Family justice
This paper compares the findings of British and American feminists on intra-family equity in their society with the recent findings on welfare and burden distribution of poor families in poor countries, and finds that the two are similar in many aspects about gender injustice.
In these two societies, due to discrimination and gender segregation in the workplace and the belief that women are "naturally" responsible for all or most unpaid housework, women’s opportunities to engage in paid work are limited. Whether in developed or developing countries, a large number of women’s work is unpaid, and women are considered to be "unproductive". Therefore, there is a huge gap between male and female economic participation in national statistics. The view that women’s work is of low value (despite the fact that they do more in most places, and this is crucial for the survival of family members) leads to the devaluation of women’s value and less power inside and outside the family. This in turn makes them lack the ability to reduce their dependence on men economically. Therefore, women fall into "a cycle of socially caused and distinctively asymmetric vulnerability". Moreover, as mentioned above, in many poor countries, this power difference is not only reflected in the overwork of women, but also in the deprivation of feeding, health care and education for girls, and even in whether they can be born.
In rich and poor countries, women’s participation in work outside the family can generally improve their status in the family, but this point needs further deliberation. Comparing Barbara Bergmann, 1986)’ s analysis of the situation of American "coolie wives" with Peggy Sanday, 1974)’ s research, we can get interesting findings. The former finds that American "coolie wives" undertake almost all the unpaid work of their families while earning money from full-time work, while the latter finds that in some third world countries, although they do not engage in "coolie wives".
This leads to the problem of women’s economic dependence. Although most poor women in poor countries work long hours every day, they are often economically dependent on men all over the world. This is also "similar but worse" than the situation of many women in rich countries. This is because many of their jobs are unpaid, and even paid jobs are paid less. Feminist critics believe that in many cases, development theory and development policy makers only think that the change of "progress" has intensified women’s economic dependence on men. Mainstream theorists always regard women as dependents, but they don’t notice that from the perspective of women, technology, geographical mobility and the transition from subsistence economy to market economy are not pure benefits, but crowd out women from traditional economic and social roles, make them enter the modern sector, suffer discrimination and exploitation, and the cash income they get is often lower than the level of subsistence, which in turn increases women’s economic dependence.
In rich and poor countries, women, as the sole breadwinner of their families, often face special difficulties. In most countries, discrimination against women in employment, salary, retention and promotion is widespread, which is obviously unfavorable to families headed by women. In the United States, the average income of full-time women is just over two-thirds of that of full-time men; Three-fifths of the long-term poor families with children are single-parent families. The situation of some poor women in poor countries is different from that of most western women today, but it is obviously worse: even if they have no other financial resources, they are actually prohibited from engaging in paid labor (based on religious laws or oppressive cultural norms).
This is a real difference, that is, most western women are no longer oppressed by paid labor. But back to the similarity: when comparing some western feminist views on justice with the work of poor women in poor countries, there is another similarity, which is related to the power dynamics within the family. Albert Hirschman’s theory of the differential exit potential has recently been used to explain the power within the family, especially the situation of women in poor countries: any factor that improves the husband’s exit (family) choice or reduces the wife’s exit choice will give men more voice or bargaining power in family relations. Similarly, any conditions that can improve the wife’s exit choice-such as the human or material capital she has gained-will increase her autonomy and put her in a more favorable negotiating position in this relationship.
In the United States, recent research shows that the economic status of women and children (compared with their needs) usually deteriorates after separation or divorce, while the economic status of men actually improves after divorce. This finding, combined with the withdrawal theory, means that the wife’s bargaining power is weaker in marriage. In poor countries, severe poverty combined with women’s lack of paid employment opportunities has increased women’s dependence on men, and men’s power in the family-which has been recognized by highly patriarchal cultural norms in most cases-is likely to be strengthened.
Policy enlightenment
Recently, scholars who study the situation of poor women in poor countries have put forward some solutions, which are very similar to those put forward by western feminists who mainly care about their own society. (The "solution to the problem" here refers to what theorists and social scientists need to do to correct their analysis and what policymakers need to do to solve the social problem itself. )
First of all, we must strongly challenge the dichotomy between the public sphere and the family sphere, and draw people’s attention to the unfairness within the family-including various forms of abuse, unfair distribution of food and health care, etc.
Secondly, from the above point of view, the analysis unit that conducts research and formulates policies must be an individual, not a family. For example, Dasgupta, 1993) thinks that, considering that men have a greater say in politics, public decisions that affect the poor in poor countries are often guided by men’s preferences, rather than women’s needs (which often conflict with them); "Maximizing happiness as a model to explain family behavior must be rejected … The goal of public policy should be people, not families … The government needs to realize that families are a resource allocation mechanism".
In particular, women in poor countries are more likely than women in rich countries to provide the only or main financial support for their families. They need as many opportunities as men to get credit, skills training, labor market and technology, and their jobs need equal pay for equal work. For the survival of the family, for the overall social and economic status of women, and for improving their bargaining power in the family, there is an increasing need for policies to promote women’s full participation in the economy and production.
Enlightenment for thinking about justice
Finally, this paper briefly discusses and compares two different ways of thinking about gender justice in different cultures, and argues that for feminists who think about justice, if John Rawls’s justice theory is revised to take women and family into consideration, it will become an important ideological resource, especially the application of veil of ignorance. Because if everyone only from their own point of view, it will be difficult for us to put forward any principles of justice. However, veil of ignorance can hide his personal characteristics or social status from people in the original state, thus forcing them to consider as many different voices as possible, and pay special attention to those worst social situations. Veil of ignorance can make us reconcile the seemingly contradictory requirements of universality of justice theory and consideration of multiple differences among human beings.
Ruth Anna Putnam advocated a strong anti-essentialism stance in her thesis, and accused Rawls and the author of this article of being exclusive essentialism to varying degrees. She put forward an "interactive" or "dialogic" feminism, that is, listening to the voices of women of color and women of different classes, and using all the voices she heard in theoretical construction. Admittedly, listening and discussing have many merits; On the bright side, they are the foundation of democracy. However, we can’t always be inspired just by asking those who seem to be suffering from unfair treatment what they want. Because people often internalize their oppression so well that they do not know what rights they should enjoy as human beings. The same is true of gender inequality. People who are severely exploited sometimes not only accept these exploitation, but also feel happy because of some "small mercies". Due to deep-rooted ideology and other reasons, the essence of being deprived of rights is sometimes suppressed and covered up. However, it is ethically wrong to underestimate the loss of their well-being because of their survival strategies.
Compromise and acceptance of the status quo is not a good prescription for social justice. Therefore, this paper holds that it is completely reasonable for people who have not been indoctrinated by unequal culture and social norms to stand up and criticize this culture constructively. After all, distance does not mean indifference: dedicated outsiders are often better at analyzing and criticizing social injustice than people living in relevant cultures. This is why concepts like Archimedes point like "the original position" are so valuable. As Papanek pointed out, "well-socialized" women are internalized as a necessary condition for successful women’s growth in a culture with cruel customs. Although these women may keep vivid memories of their great pain, they will continue these cruel acts and impose them on their own daughters, or at least allow their own daughters to suffer them.
As some feminist scholars who study the development theory have shown, using the concept of gender and refusing to let differences stifle or fragment our analysis does not mean that we should over-generalize or try to apply "standardized" solutions to women’s problems in different situations. For example, Martha Chen believes that it is necessary to make a concrete analysis of women’s roles and constraints before making solutions and policies. Papanek also believes that helping women realize the oppression they are suffering requires quite in-depth and specific cultural knowledge.
Therefore, the conclusion of this paper is that gender itself is an extremely important analytical category, and we should not be paralyzed by the fact that there are differences between women. As long as we are careful and make our judgments based on empirical evidence, it is possible to generalize many aspects of gender inequality. Theories developed in the western context, at least to a great extent, can be applied to women in different cultural backgrounds. From different places, different classes, different races and different cultures, we all find similarities in the causal particularity of gender inequality, but they are different in scope and severity.
Note:
1. "false consciousness": a term in Marxist theory, which refers to the exploitative relationship in class society that is misled and covered up by material, ideology and system design.
2. Spelman, Elizabeth V. 1988. Inessential woman: Problems of exclusion in feminist thought. Boston: Beacon.
Compile | Lu Dawei
Audit | ｜Anders
Final review | Li Zhixian
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ID: ThePoliticalReview
Original title: Classic Compilation | Improving Rawls’ Theoretical Framework of Justice: A Perspective of Gender Issues and Cultural Differences